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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to investigate the role that institutional shareholders play in acquisition 
decision using micro data in the Chinese stock market during 2003-2008. Acquisition 
decision is the selection and coordination process of shareholders as strategic alliances, 
which is determined by corporate acquisition ability, composition of institutional 
shareholders and concentration of tradable share (TS) in China. We use Heckman 
selection model to surmount the selection biases in acquisition decision. We find that 
institutional shareholders including qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), social 
security funds (SSF), security firms (SF) and security investment funds (SIF), as well as 
TS concentration affect acquisition probability rather than annual acquisition scale. SSF, 
SIF and TS concentration can increase acquisition probability while QFII decreases it. 
Our paper contributes to the published literature in three ways. First, we offer a model to 
understand the selection and coordination process of acquisition decision. Second, we 
investigate whether institutional shareholders could effectively monitor annual acquisition 
scale. Third, we identify Heckman selection problem that institutional shareholders could 
affect PLCs’ acquisition decision on whether to acquire rather than how much to acquire.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate acquisition has become a more and more important phenomenon in the Chinese 
stock market. All completed deals sum up to about 798 billion RMB Yuan (110 billion US 
dollar, see more details in Table 1) over the period of 2003-2008.
1
 In 2003, about 24% 
Chinese publicly listed companies (PLCs) acquired total 51 billion Yuan of stocks or 
assets, as the average annual acquisition scale was about 170 million Yuan. Five years 
later, the proportion of acquiring PLCs increased to 33% as total acquisition scale 
increased 5 times (277 billion Yuan). The average annual acquisition scale (536 million 
Yuan) in 2008 was above 3 times that in 2003. Thus, in absolute and relative sense, more 
and more Chinese PLCs have been involved into acquisition activities of larger scale than 
before.  
At the same time, shareholders with large investment stakes (institutional 
shareholders) are becoming the main participant in the Chinese stock market. In the early 
stages of capital market development in China, the total shares are divided into a major 
part of non-tradable share (NTS) and a minor part of tradable share (TS). The controlling 
shareholder (NTS owner) is usually a State-Owned enterprise (SOE), so institutional 
shareholders can only hold TS as minor shareholders in the ownership structure. At 
beginning of 2005, about two thirds of the Chinese stock market was composed of NTS 
(Beltratti et al., 2011).
2
 Hence, the controlling NTS shareholders would misappropriate 
the interests of minor TS shareholders through such channels as dividend appropriation or 
corporate loans to controlling shareholders (Bai et al., 2000; Wei et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2009; Jiang et al., 2010). In order to solve this problem, the Chinese government 
launched the split share structure reform in 2005 to compensate TS shareholders and 
allow all shares to be tradable (Firth et al., 2010). By the end of 2007, a total of 1254 
PLCs had accomplished the split share structure reform, representing over 97% of the 
market capitalization (Li et al., 2011).  
As more and more shares became tradable, the investment of institutional 
shareholders such as qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), social security funds 
(SSF), security firms (SF) and security investment funds (SIF) developed very fast. 
Institutional shareholders held less than 10% value of the TS share market in 2003. This 
percentage rose up more than 5 times to about 60% in 2008 as QFII and SIF held more 
than 25% value of the TS share market. Hence, institutional shareholders have formed a 
powerful party in determining whether a proposal can be passed/rejected in the board of 
Chinese PLCs (Zeng et al., 2011).  
(Table 1 around here) 
Since acquisition and institutional shareholders activism are always important 
agendas for corporate management, their coincident fast development in the Chinese 
stock market arise a very interesting question: what role do institutional shareholders play 
in the Chinese PLCs’ acquisition decision? This paper focuses on institutional 
shareholders in acquisition decision using recent available data in the Chinese stock 
market (Shanghai and Shenzhen). Our paper contributes to the published literature in 
                                                             
1
 We exclude special treated (ST) companies and financial institutions as described below. The exchange 
rate of The Penn World Table (PWT 7.0, 1 US dollar=6.95 RMB Yuan in 2008) is used to calculate the 
equivalent value in US dollars. We keep on using the RMB Yuan (￥) as the currency unit in this paper.   
2
 It is so-called split share structure, where NTS cannot be traded in the capital market, while all else is 
equal with TS. The NTS are mainly composed of state shares (held by the state) and legal person shares 
(held by SOE and other non-bank institutions). The TS comprise A-shares, denominated in RMB and traded 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; and H-shares, listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(Lee, 2009; Lee et al., 2008). We concentrate on the Chinese A-share PLCs in this paper. 
 
3 
 
three ways. First, we offer a simple model to understand the selection and coordination 
process of corporate acquisition decision. Second, we investigate whether institutional 
shareholders could effectively monitor annual acquisition scale using an industry fixed 
effect model. We find that institutional shareholders have no significant effect on annual 
acquisition scale. Third, we identify this problem as Heckman selection biases that 
institutional shareholders could affect PLCs’ acquisition through the coordination and 
selection process on whether to acquire rather than how much to acquire. Hence, we 
apply two-step estimation on the acquisition equation. Our results shed new light on the 
institutional shareholder activism in acquisition decision.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the second section summarizes 
the previous literature; the third sector introduces the empirical model and the hypotheses; 
the fourth section presents the data and some descriptive statistics, while the empirical 
results are discussed in the fifth section. Some concluding remarks are provided in the 
sixth section.  
 
2. Literature review 
In the financial literature, institutional shareholders are supposed to play an active role 
even to be the most likely monitors in corporate governance by many authors such as 
Brickley et al. (1988); Smith (1996); Gillan and Starks (2000); Hartzell and Starks (2003); 
Almanzan et al. (2005) and Cheng et al. (2010). For our particular interest in corporate 
acquisitions, Opler and Sokobin (1995) find that coordinated institutional shareholders 
decrease the acquisition rate of focused corporation. Moreover, different institutional 
shareholders seemingly have different attitudes on corporate acquisition. Black (1990) 
discusses on the PPFs (public pension funds) and argues that the institutional shareholder 
activism is very prominent in PPFs due to its size and independence, which cannot be 
shared by most corporate pension fund.
3
 In more recent literature, Borokhovich et al. 
(2006) find that only institutional shareholders who are outside and large shareholders 
(unaffiliated blockholders) exert influence on PLCs’ decisions on acquisition. Qiu (2008) 
also finds that PPFs only reduce the likelihood of bad M&A, but no effect on good M&A. 
These studies are mainly on the capital markets of developed countries such as the 
USA which are characterized by diffused corporate ownership and a high level of 
investor protection, and the main agency problem there is the conflict of interest between 
outside shareholders and inside managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) ; Admati et al. (1994); Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998)). 
However, most emerging capital markets are characterized by concentrated ownership 
and poor investor protection, which shifts the main agency problem to conflicts of interest 
between majority and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Su (2010) argues that 
the ownership structure is germane to the understanding of corporate diversification 
strategies and debt-equity financing choices of the Chinese PLCs. Zeng et al. (2011) 
suggest that institutional shareholders in China are more likely to collude rather than fight 
with controlling shareholders and exacerbate the agency problem between majority and 
minority shareholders. Hence, the different role of institutional shareholders in an 
                                                             
3
 Some other characteristics also encourage PPFs’ monitoring effect in corporate governance. First of all, 
PPFs retain effective voting control of their assets. In 1993, PPFs in US retained voting control over 98.9% 
of the stock they owned, compared to only 66.4% for the average institutional shareholder (Brancato, 1993). 
Furthermore, indexing strategies are common among PPFs. Davis and Steil (2001) document that 
indexation takes 54% of public pension funds’ domestic equity and only 24% of that of corporate fund. 
Thus, Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest selling constraints imposed by indexing strategies provide a 
motivation for shareholder activism. 
 
4 
 
emerging market like China is of great interest both theoretically and in practice. 
Furthermore, acquisition decisions, like other major strategic decisions, involve 
complexity, ambiguity and lack of structure (Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985). Decision 
makers such as the controlling shareholders, management and the institutional 
shareholders who are strategic alliances within the PLCs (Todeva and Knoke, 2005), 
cannot simultaneously consider or process all the variables and data involved in a 
decision as complex as acquisition. Hence, uncertainty of acquisition market and 
overconfidence of alliance partners may cause decision-making biases of alliance partners 
and possibly fail the alliance and acquisition proposal (Chao, 2011).  
In order to function in uncertain acquisition market, as well as to avoid the stress that 
such ambiguity produces, decision makers may use perceptual process or heuristics for 
simplifying information processing. “In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but 
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) argues that behavioural uncertainty can 
be resolved by implementing safeguards to mitigate a partner’s opportunistic behaviour. 
On the other hand, the literature on relational assets, such as trust, offers another way to 
more closely align the interests of the two parties, eliminate unpredictable reactions and 
reduce transaction costs such as searching/matching information and monitoring (Gulati, 
1995). Although previous authors have acknowledged that safeguards and trust are 
effective ways to reduce dysfunctional behaviour, their mechanisms are still unclear. One 
of the most extreme views is taken by Williamson who rejects the usefulness of the 
concept of trust and believes instead that the economics of contracts should be based upon 
an assumption of opportunism (Williamson, 1993).  
Chao (2011) also argues that in dyadic decision making, when a focal firm gives 
insufficient consideration to the contingent behaviour of its partner, the firm is susceptible 
to three types of overconfidence: overoptimistically judging the likelihood that the 
alliance will result in a good outcome; overestimating its ability to manage the alliance so 
as to deliver the desired outcome; and overestimating the benefits of its relationship with 
the partner and trusting the partner too much. If a focal firm trusts its partner excessively, 
it may neglect the development of appropriate formal controls and rely too much on 
informal controls, such as trust or a previous working model, to govern interactions with 
its partner. Trust is a double-edged sword: it can discourage opportunistic behaviour, but 
under certain conditions it can also foster opportunistic behaviour (Anderson and Jap, 
2005). Hence, it is very interesting to explore how controlling shareholders, management 
and the institutional shareholders maintain their alliance relationship within the Chinese 
PLCs and make efficient acquisition decisions together in a market with high uncertainty. 
Another strand of literature is about collaboration or coordination process of 
institutional shareholders on acquisition decision. Firm-as-contract theorists argue that 
participants agree to cooperate with each other within organizations (i.e., through 
contracts), rather than simply deal with each other through the market, to minimize the 
costs of search, coordination, insecurity, etc (Williamson and Winter, 1991). Since an 
asymmetry always exists in organizational abilities to exert power and control over 
another alliance organization and its resources (Oliver, 1990), institutional shareholders 
often have disadvantages in structure of power, resource and information. The 
institutional shareholders have to choose proper collaboration way to avoid market 
uncertainties and hierarchical rigidities (Todeva and Knoke, 2005).  
As minor shareholders, institutional investors have too high transaction costs to 
bargain with controlling shareholders and management, so they would better just follow 
the major shareholders and powerful management if they do not want to vote with feet. 
Hill and Jones (1992) and Freeman and Evan (1990) place greater emphasis on the 
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process of multiple-stakeholder coordination than on the specific agreements/bargains. In 
other words, the institutional shareholders’ gains to acquisition are higher if all alliance 
partners are coordinated, so that there is a “strategic complementarity” (Ball and Romer, 
1991). Todeva and Knoke (2005) also argue that institutional shareholders, as equity 
investors have high integration and formalization in the governance of their 
inter-organizational relationships which refers to combinations of legal and social control 
mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding the alliance partners’ resource 
contributions, administrative responsibilities, and division of rewards from their joint 
activities. Therefore, this paper directly tests whether all institutional shareholders would 
follow the acquisition decisions of controlling shareholders and such coordination make a 
crucial distinction between different institutional shareholders. 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
We postulate a latent variable of acquisition ability (AAit) for a Chinese PLC i in year t 
which follows a continuous (normal) distribution conditioning on its characteristics of 
corporate finance and governance. We cannot observe acquisition ability directly, but we 
can observe the characteristics of corporate finance (Finit) and governance (Goverit), and 
expect acquisition ability as outside institutional shareholders. Better financial condition 
and more efficient corporate governance would increase corporate acquisition ability: 
әAAit/әFinit>0, әAAit/әGoverit >0. We can also observe how much the annual acquisition 
scale (ASit) is in this year if the PLC acquisition decision is coordinated successfully in 
the board.  
However, there is search and match problem in the acquisition market as the possible 
acquired stocks and assets could be offered randomly with a gap between market offer 
and latent acquisition ability. Acquisition happens only if the expected PLC’s acquisition 
ability is larger or equal to the market offers. High uncertainty and transaction costs in the 
acquisition market make institution shareholders impossible to efficiently monitor their 
alliances. Hence, institution shareholders have to simplify information processing and 
decide whether to collaborate or coordinate with alliances’ acquisition decisions rather 
than monitor accurate acquisition scale. In long run equilibrium of acquisition, 
information of corporate acquisition ability such as characteristics of corporate finance 
and governance would be completely revealed to outside institution shareholders by their 
strategic alliances. Thus, the rational expectation on acquisition ability should be equal to 
the expected acquisition scale in long run equilibrium, but unrelated to institutional 
shareholders’ composition (Instit) or the concentration of TS shareholders (Top5it):  
 
E(ASit)= E(AAit| Finit, Goverit, Instit, Top5it) 
әE(ASit)/әFinit>0, 
әE(ASit)/әGoverit >0, 
әE(ASit)/әInstit =0, 
әE(ASit)/әTop5it =0                          (1) 
 
which leads to our first and second hypotheses as follows. 
 
H1. Annual acquisition scale of Chinese PLC is positively related to its acquisition 
ability which is determined by its characteristics of corporate finance and 
governance.  
H2. Institutional shareholders’ composition or the concentration of TS shareholders is 
not related to the annual acquisition scale as the acquisition market offers are 
random with high uncertainty and transaction costs. 
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Controlling shareholders of the Chinese PLCs usually are SOEs with “investment 
hunger” and “expansion-drive” (Kornai, 1980; Zou, 1991) who always intend to acquire 
stocks and assets as much as they can if proper acquisition market offers appear. As more 
and more shares become tradable, the transferable control of Chinese PLC allows 
management to do more efficient acquisition and enhance corporate profitability (Chen et 
al. (2008)). Management knows better information about acquisition market than owners 
and need a discretion right to manage the annual acquisition scale. And, quite a bit of 
evidence points to the dominance of managerial rather than shareholder motives in firms' 
acquisition decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, the SOE controlling shareholders 
and management may collude to offer an overconfident annual acquisition plan in the 
board and seek a bigger discretion on acquisition sources within company than latent 
acquisition ability (Chao, 2011). They intend to coordinate outside minor TS shareholders 
(including institutional shareholders) to pass the annual plan. The more concentrated is 
the TS shareholders, for example, top 5 TS shareholder own more than 20% of total 
shares (Top5it>20%), the easier is the coordination to be succeeded, because coordination 
of numerous minor shareholders with different preference structures would be more 
costly than a few major ones.  
In the same vein, with expected acquisition ability (based on financial and 
governance characteristics of PLCs) in mind, different institutional shareholders may 
have different attitudes from controlling shareholders and management on the annual 
acquiring plan. The coordination in the board would succeed if their expected acquisition 
ability is more than the planned acquisition scale. Alternatively, institutional shareholders 
fight against the plan by voting with hand and feet. Therefore, coordination Cit is 
dependent on latent acquisition ability (AAit), composition of institutional shareholders 
(Instit) and the concentration of TS shareholders (Top5it):  
 
Cit=f (AAit, Instit, Top5it) 
әf/әAAit >0, 
әf/әInstit > or <0, 
әf/әTop5it >0,                            (2) 
 
which leads to our third, fourth and fifth hypotheses as follows. 
 
H3. The presence of institutional shareholders is positively related with the chances 
of acquisition if they accept the coordination.   
H4. The presence of institutional shareholders is negatively related with the chances 
of acquisition if they reject the coordination.  
H5. The more concentrated are the TS shareholders they are more likely to be 
coordinated on acquisition decision hence positively related with the chances of 
acquisition. 
 
 
Therefore, whether the presence of institutional shareholder increases or decreases 
the acquisition probability is an empirical question per se. Following the Heckman 
selection model (Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; Heckman, 1976), an underlying regression 
relation between log form annual acquisition scale (lnASit) and conditions of corporate 
finance and governance is as follows, 
 
lnASit= Finitβ1+Goveritβ2+u1it       regression equation  (3) 
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Log form annual acquisition scale is not always observed. Acquisition happens only TS 
shareholders (including institutional shareholders) of PLCs are coordinated to a degree 
(Cit) for example, more than 50% of shareholders agree with the annual acquisition plan, 
that is  
 
Citγ+ u2it >0              selection equation   (4) 
 
where γ is the vector of coefficients in equation (2). Residual errors of two equations (3) 
and (4) follow normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviations of σ and 1, and 
are correlated each other.  
 
u1 ~ N(0; σ) 
u2 ~ N(0; 1) 
corr(u1; u2) = ρ 
 
When ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to equation (3) yield biased 
results. In our case, equation (3) describes the annual acquisition scale of acquiring PLCs. 
The shareholders of PLCs choose whether to acquire in this year, and thus, whether their 
annual acquisition scale is observed in our data. Management would choose how much to 
acquire, “right of manage”, according to the random offers in acquisition market. A 
solution for the selection biased acquisition equation can be found if there are some 
variables that strongly affect the chances for acquisition (the selection and coordination 
process of acquisition decision), but not the annual acquisition scale. Such variables 
might be the composition of institutional shareholders and TS shareholding concentration 
as in equation (4). Heckman selection model is applied to provide consistent, 
asymptotically efficient estimates for all the parameters of variables of corporate finance 
and governance in the regression equation (3). 
We follow Richardson (2006) to test whether institutional shareholders and TS 
shareholding concentration affect acquisition decision. A Trans-log acquisition function 
can be expressed as follows:  
 
lnASit=β0+β1Finit+β2Goverit,+β3Instit+β4Top5it+β5Yeart+β6Indj+εit       (5) 
  
where lnASit is the log form annual acquisition scale of PLC i in year t. We examine the 
relation between annual acquisition scale and characteristics of corporate finance and 
governance (hypotheses 1-2) by testing β1 – β4.  
And then, the traditional two-step Heckman estimates are firstly computed using 
Heckman’s (1979) procedure. We examine the relation between TS concentration, the 
presence of institutional shareholders and acquisition probability (hypotheses 3-5) by 
testing vector of coefficients γ in the probit estimates of the selection equation 
 
  (               |    )   (    )                 (6) 
 
Probability of acquisition is given by institutional coordination (Cit) which is conditional 
on expected acquisition ability (Finit and Goverit), composition of institutional 
shareholders (Instit) and TS shareholding concentration (Top5it). From these estimates, the 
nonselection hazard—what Heckman (1979) referred to as the inverse of the Mills’ ratio, 
mit —for each observation is computed as   
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where φ is the normal density. The two-step parameter estimates of β are obtained by 
augmenting the regression equation with the non-selection hazard mit. Thus the regressors 
of equation (5) become [Finit Goverit mit], and we obtain the additional parameter estimate 
βm on the variable containing the non-selection hazard. And then, we test regression 
estimates using the non-selection hazard (Heckman, 1979) provide starting values for 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. The log likelihood for acquisiton, lnLit = lit, is 
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   {
     
(𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆       ) 
 
√    
}  
 
 
(
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆       
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   (     )                                                                                        𝑡         
} (8) 
 
where lnΦ() is the standard cumulative normal distribution. In the maximum likelihood 
estimation, σ and ρ are not directly estimated. Directly estimated are log form standard 
error of residual in acquisition equation (lnσ), selectivity effect λ(=ρσ) and       ρ  
 
 
  (
  ρ
  ρ
). We will test these statistics to justify the Heckman selection model. 
 
4. Data description 
The empirical tests employ the CCER (China Center for Economic Research) PLC 
database of financial statement, corporate governance and institutional shareholders. This 
dataset include all PLCs in the Chinese stock market during the fiscal years 2003-2008. 
We exclude PLCs subject to special treatment (ST, that is, firms reporting two 
consecutive annual losses) and financial institutions (Global Industry Standard 
Classification between 401010 and 403030) because investing and financing activities are 
ambiguous for these firms.  
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of annual acquisition scale (AS), corporate 
finance (Fin), corporate governance (Gover), institutional shareholders (Inst) and TS 
concentration (Top5) in both acquiring sample and full sample. Following equation (5), 
we examine the relation between annual acquisition scale and characteristics of corporate 
finance and governance (hypotheses 1) by testing β1 and β2. β1 in equation (5) is the vector 
of coefficients of corporate financial variables (Finit) including:  
 
1) lnSalesit is log annual sales; 
2) lnCashit is the log annual cash holding, including cash and tradable financial 
assets; 
3) lnIntastit is log intangible asset of the firm;  
4) Leverageit (book value of total debt deflated by the book value of total asset); 
5) lnCapexpit is the log capital expenditure, which is the cash payment on 
purchasing fixed asset, intangible asset and other fixed asset minus the cash 
received by selling fixed asset, intangible asset and other fixed asset, a measure 
of internal investment); 
6) CashDivit is annual cash dividend payout; 
7) Qit (Tobins’ Q ratio, book value of total assets deflated by market value of total 
assets, indicating the growth opportunity); 
 
First, economic resources of acquiring firms are important factors to determine 
acquisition ability. Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hubbard (1998) suggest that acquisition scale 
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increases with firm size significantly. We use annual sale and cash holding to measure 
financial resources. Rubin (1973) invents a model of investment-expansion based on 
resource theory and argues that a firm may choose to acquire if the acquirer owns a strong 
expertise, such as R&D department or financial department. His argument shows the 
off-balanced resource owned by acquirer would influence the decision to invest. Hence, 
we use intangible asset as the proxy for the non-tangible resources of acquisition ability.  
Second, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that increasing debt may reduce the 
expropriation by managers. Jensen (1986) continues his argument that debt would 
exercise a hard constrains on manager’s investment, and the financial leverage is 
negatively related with the over-investment. Lang et al. (1996) also find that leverage is 
negatively related to capital expenditure. Moreover, Jensen (1986) and Hoshi et al. (1991) 
argue that the more cash the firm owns, the easier the firm acquisition will harm 
shareholder interest. Managers may prefer acquisition rather than pay cash dividend. 
However, these arguments may be not true in an emerging market such as China because 
the management in emerging capital markets is more likely to collaborate rather than fight 
with controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Chen et al. 2008). Hence, we include 
leverage, capital expenditure and cash dividend as control variables in this study.  
Finally, Tobin’s Q is developed by James Tobin in 1969 as the ratio between the 
market value and replacement costs of total asset. It reflects the capital market 
expectation to the asset. Lang et al. (1991) develop a measure of free cash flow using 
Tobin's Q to distinguish between firms that have good investment opportunities and those 
that do not. They find that value could be created through acquisition if high Tobin’s Q 
firm acquires low Tobin’s Q firm. Thus, we follow this tradition to use Q as a proxy of 
acquisition ability.  
β2 in equation (5) is the vector of coefficients of corporate governance variables 
(Goverit) including: 
 
1) BoardSizeit is the number of directors of a company;  
2) Meetingtimesit is the board meeting times per annum;  
3) Inddpropit is portion of number of independent directors among board members; 
4) Magtholdingit is the shares percentage holding by senior management; 
5) Dualityit is CEO duality, representing leadership structure of board (0 represents 
the situation that CEO holds the position of Chair of the board of Directors, 
while 1 refers to splitting two positions between two different individuals); 
6) Nationalownedit is a dummy variable representing the ownership (status of the 
largest share-holder having 7 different natures, designate 1 as state owned 
company and 0 for all others);  
7) (Nation*Duality)it is an interaction dummy (1 refers to the situation that the 
company is state owned and CEO and chairman is separate, 0 otherwise); 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that the board suffers from dysfunction if board size 
increases beyond the limit (about 9 members from their results). They also show that 
more board meeting times will lead to enhanced effectiveness of the board. Board size 
and meeting frequency may affect firm’s acquisition decision. Empirical researches show 
mix-up results on the effect of independent directors on firm’s acquisition decision. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) summarize that the higher ratio of independent directors 
in board would make favorite decision to firm in the events of CEO turnover, CEO 
compensation, poison pills and hostile takeover. Principle-agency theory implies the 
senior management may be slack and opportunistic. Thus, shares holding by senior 
management are used to measure the self-monitoring effect in acquisition decision.  
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Boyd (1995) and Baliga et al. (1996) argue that duality of CEO and chairman would 
help to be creative and effective in decision making, information sharing and 
communication, thereafter to improve the operating performance. However, Goyal and 
Park (2002) argue that the person holding position of chair should be different from that 
holding CEO to maintain the independency and effectiveness of the board. Chen et al. 
(2008) argue that China state owned PLCs confronted risks of managerial entrenchment, 
and managerial agent issue is quite different from other firms owned by private 
shareholders hence the investment behavior differs significantly. Therefore, the identity 
of largest shareholder (state or private) is taken into account with regard to annual 
acquisition scale in the Chinese stock market.  
 
(Table 2 around here) 
 
Next, we examine the relation between presence of institutional shareholders and 
coordination and annual acquisition scale (hypothesis 2) by testing β3 and β4. β3 is the 
vector of coefficients of the presence of the institutional shareholders (Instit). β4 is 
coefficient of TS shareholding concentration (Top5it ). We only consider tradable shares 
owned by institutional shareholders and top 5 tradable shareholders because they can 
choose to sell them in the exchange market rather than accept the coordination of 
controlling shareholder, hence being more comparable with Parrino et al’s (2003) 
argument that some institutional shareholders vote with their feet by selling their shares as 
long as they are not satisfied with the performance of the management.  
Currently, there are eleven kinds of investors in the Chinese TS market: 1) QFII; 2) 
SSF; 3) SF; 4) SIF; 5) trust firms; 6) insurance firms; 7) occupational funds; 8) brokers; 9) 
financial plans; 10) individuals and 11) others. Among them, we concentrate on the most 
important four types of institutional investors: QFII, SSF, SF and SIF among the top 10 
tradable shareholders. TS shareholders (including institutional investors) have become 
more and more important in the ownership structure of Chinese PLCs. For example, QFII 
in top 10 tradable shareholders held about 6% of total shares in 2008 in contrast to only 
0.6 percent in 2003. SIF’s percentage also increased from 0.16% to about 2%. The total 
share proportions of top 5 tradable shareholders are the proxy of TS concentration which 
also increased from 1.79% in 2003 to 17% in 2008 (Table 2). 
In equation (5), year and industrial dummies are always controlled to capture time 
dynamics and industry fixed effects; εit is a random error.  
There are still some factors influencing acquisition scale, known but hard to quantify. 
These factors include some details of deal: the target selection, acquisition timing and 
payout methods (cash, stock, or combination of both), whether there is any third party to 
contest. Due to agency cost problem, behaviors by management deviate from 
shareholders’ interest, such as excessively over payment, bad timing to acquire, and 
blurred acquisition motivation. All elements mentioned above are captured by the residual 
error in equation (5), i.e. εit.
4
 These variables are also applied into selection equation (6) 
to examine the relation between presence of institutional shareholders and TS 
concentration and acquisition probability (hypothesis 3-5).   
 
5. Empirical Results 
H1. We adopt stepwise method to examine the sensitivity of variables. Five different 
                                                             
4
 Since the take-over market in China is still in the infancy stage and almost no anti-taken case happens 
during 2003-2008, so we ignore the relation between anti-takeover and annual acquisition scale in this 
paper.   
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specifications are established to quantify equation (5). All specifications include year 
dummies and industry dummies. Table 3 presents the results from these models. Column 
1 shows the expected signs of variables from theory. The specification (1) only includes 
the corporate finance variables. This simple model shows that variables of cash-holding, 
capital expenditure, leverage and Tobin’s Q are significantly positively associated with 
annual acquisition scale as we expect. No significant association is found between sales, 
intangible asset and annual acquisition scale. It suggests that firm size is not important as 
cash resources for acquisition decision in the Chinese PLCs. Resources of acquisition are 
mainly tangible asset such as cash rather than the intangible asset such as R&D and 
branding. Cash dividend payout does not have important role in acquisition scale, which 
is consistent with the fact that the Chinese PLCs have no constraints of cash dividend and 
do not take cash dividend into account when they make the acquisition decision. 
Based on the specification (1), extra variables concerning corporate governance 
characteristics are added into the specification (2) to examine whether and how certain 
governance mechanisms impact the acquisition scale. These governance characteristics 
include board size, annual board meeting times, the portion of independent directors in 
board and senior management holding. The specification (2) shows that, financial 
variables remain similar coefficients to what they behave in the first model. Board size, 
annual board meeting times and the portion of independent directors in board are found to 
be significantly positively related to acquisition scale. Giving shares to executives shows 
a good self-monitoring effect. These results confirm findings in literature that bigger 
board may bring more irresponsible acquisition while independent directors could not 
alleviate this problem.  
(Table 3 around here) 
We further explore another two corporate governance variables (duality of CEO and 
national ownership) impact on acquisition scale in the specification (3). Both of these two 
variables are dummies. For variable Duality, it takes value of 1 if the CEO and Chair are 
held by different individuals and 0 otherwise. The coefficient for variable CEO duality 
-0.335, significant at 1% level, indicates that the company with departure of CEO and 
Chair would have about 33.5% lower annual acquisition scale than PLCs without 
departure of CEO and Chair. It possibly suggests that CEO duality mechanism works in 
restricting overconfident acquisition.  
For variable National owned, it takes value of 1 if the company is state owned 
enterprise, and 0 otherwise. State Owned Enterprises are supposed to acquire more 
because of the external driving forces exercised by the Chinese government at different 
levels. However, the insignificant coefficient of owner variable suggests that whether the 
largest shareholder is stated owned or not has no significant impact on annual acquisition 
scale. It is consistent with our hypothesis that annual acquisition scale should be unrelated 
with ownership structure because the acquisition market offers are random with high 
uncertainty and transaction costs.  
The specification (4) is a sensitivity test to examine the relation between the identity 
and separation of duality with regard to acquisition scale. We design an interaction term 
by multiplying national ownership and duality, identifying the effect of the state owned 
PLCs with departed CEO and Chair on acquisition scale. No significant coefficient found 
for this interacted variable confirms our finding that annual acquisition scale is dependent 
on random market offers and not related to national ownership.  
Another interesting finding is that the intangible capital shows some restricting effect 
on acquisition after we control duality and national ownership. It may be from a fact that 
only national owned firms existed before the 1979 reform. National owned firms have 
longer history and more intangible capital than private owned firms. Intangible capital 
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variable may reflect some positive effect of national ownership in specification (1-3), so 
not as significantly negative in specification (4). Specification (1)–(4) justify hypothesis 1 
that the annual acquisition scale of Chinese PLC’s is positively related to its acquisition 
ability which is determined by characteristics of corporate finance and governance.   
 
H2. The further investigation focuses on the monitoring effect of different institutional 
shareholders on annual acquisition scale. We intend to indentify whether any particular or 
in general, institutional shareholders will restrict or encourage annual acquisition scale. 
Specification (5) in Table 3 tests the monitoring effect of institutional shareholders by 
regressing different institution’s holding percentages and TS concentration on annual 
acquisition scale. All control variables of corporate finance and governance shows 
reasonable and consistent signs with the results in specification (1)–(4).  
Institutional ownership and TS concentration show no significant effect on annual 
acquisition scale, which is consistent with selection assumption that the institutional 
shareholders may only affect whether to acquire rather than how much to acquire 
(Heckman, 1979; Qiu, 2008). Specification (5) justifies hypothesis 2 that the presence of 
institutional shareholders and TS concentration are not related to the annual acquisition 
scale because the acquisition market offers are random.  
   
H3-5. Table 4 presents results of traditional two-step and maximum likelihood 
(controlling industry cluster) Heckman selection model. Two-step is a simplified model 
for large sample as ML estimation would be more efficient for a small sample. Heckman 
selection model allows likelihood of acquisition to be a function of institutional 
shareholders, top 5 shareholders, and (implicitly) the expected acquisition ability (via the 
inclusion of all explanatory variables of corporate finance and governance in acquisition 
equation, which we think determine the latent acquisition ability). This specification 
loosens the assumption that the coordination process of institutional shareholder would 
not consider the corporate acquisition ability.
5
 Thus, we use composition of institutional 
shareholders and Top5 to determine whether acquisition scale is observed or not (selected 
or not selected).  
The first big change is that we are using the full sample of about 8000 PLCs in the 
selection regression, compared with the acquisition sample of about 2000 PLCs in above 
regressions. Second, we find that institutional shareholders such as QFII, SSF, SF, SIF 
and top 5 TS shareholders significantly affect the acquisition probability in Table 4. SSF, 
SIF and top 5 TS shareholders can increase acquisition probability while QFII decreases 
the chance. Hypothesis 3 is only justified for those small and inside institutional 
shareholders such as SSF and SIF, the presence of which is positively related with the 
chances of acquisition as they collude with controlling shareholders and management. 
Hypothesis 5 is only justified for QFII, which is the only institutional investor containing 
the acquisition probability. These results suggest that only large and outside institutional 
shareholders such as QFII reject the coordination proposal of controlling shareholders and 
management (Black (1990); Opler and Sokobin (1995); Borokhovich et al. (2006)). Other 
smaller and inside institutional shareholders such as SSF and SIF would choose to collude 
with controlling shareholders and management (Zeng et al. (2011)). Hypothesis 5 is 
justified that the more concentrated are the TS shareholders they are more likely to be 
                                                             
5
 We also tried a sensitivity test on the selection of institutional shareholders without considering on latent 
acquisition ability (excluding corporate finance and governance characteristics in selection regressions). 
The results from this test are very similar to those in Table 4 hence not reported here. 
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coordinated by controlling shareholders and management on acquisition decision hence 
positively related with the chances of acquisition.  
Thirdly, selectivity effect (λ=ρσ) is significantly negative. Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests 
of independent equations (ρ = 0) are easily rejected for two ML specifications. The robust 
standard errors in ML (controlling industry cluster) tend to be a bit larger, but we notice 
no systematic difference. This finding is not surprising because the Chinese PLCs are 
mainly public-owned hence no industry-specific or any other characteristics that would 
deviate from the assumptions of the Heckman model. These tests clearly justify the 
Heckman selection equation with these data. Finally, comparing the robust results of  
ML (controlling industry cluster) with column (4) of Table 3, the selection biases for all 
variables of corporate finance and governance in a simple OLS are upwards or 
insignificant except that leverage, Tobin’s Q, board size and independent director are 
significantly biased downwards.   
(Table 4 around here) 
  
6. Conclusions 
The extant literatures mention little about the monitoring effect of institutional 
shareholders in the Chinese PLCs’ acquisition. With recent available data of the Chinese 
stock market, we find evidence that large and outside institutional shareholders such as 
QFII may reject the coordination proposal of controlling shareholders and management, 
and decrease the acquisition probability. Other smaller and inside institutional 
shareholders such as SSF and SIF would choose to collaborate with controlling 
shareholders and management. And, the concentration of TS is also important for the 
coordination process in acquisition decision. More concentrated TS are positively related 
acquisition probability.  
This research is still limited by the data availability of acquisition activity in the 
Chinese stock market. Information on acquisition deal known to influence acquisition 
decision but hard to quantify, are still unavailable. For example, detailed information of 
the selection and coordination process of strategic alliances, especially the board voting 
on acquisition is not available in our data. Behaviors by management deviate from 
shareholders’ interest, such as excessively over payment, bad timing to acquire, and 
blurred acquisition motivation are not clear yet. We have to postulate a simple 
collaboration model between controlling shareholders and management. However, with 
the process of split share structure reform since 2005, institutional shareholders developed 
from nothing to powerful bargaining parties in corporate management. Our research 
provides a unique experiment on the effect of institutional investment and shareholding 
structure on PLCs’ acquisition decision and shed new light into the management decision 
of acquisition in an emerging market like China. More accurate theoretical model and 
empirical investigation should be developed in future research. This research will 
continuously induce great interest of both academy and practitioners.     
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Table 1: Annual acquisition of the Chinese PLCs, 2003-2008 
Year 
PLCs  
number 
Acquiring  
PLCs  
number 
Acquiring 
PLCs 
Proportion 
(%) 
Total 
acquisition 
scale  
(Million
￥) 
Average  
acquisition  
scale  
(Million￥) 
2003 1,261 299 23.7 50,767 170 
2004 1,352 296 21.9 76,420 258 
2005 1,399 239 17.1 36,002 151 
2006 1,430 292 20.4 78,427 269 
2007 1,537 476 31.0 279,564 587 
2008 1,583 515 32.5 276,295 536 
Total 8,562 2,117 24.7 797,475 377 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Variable Statistics Description 
Acquiring sample (AS>0, Observation No. =2,117) 
 2003 2008 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Log Acquisition Scale 17.37 2.23 0.00 22.58 18.09 2.23 0.00 24.48 
Log Sales 20.47 2.15 -8.52 26.76 13.88 12.87 -8.52 25.10 
Log Cash 19.30 1.21 14.89 23.58 19.74 1.46 11.36 24.55 
Log Intangible Asset 15.30 6.85 -9.21 22.24 16.77 6.21 -9.21 23.88 
Leverage 0.48 0.18 0.05 1.63 0.50 0.18 0.00 0.88 
Log Cap Exp 18.18 1.80 10.03 24.59 18.66 1.97 9.21 26.13 
Cash Dividend 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.50 0.10 0.14 0.00 1.20 
Tobin’s Q 1.55 0.85 1.01 4.59 1.87 1.06 -0.03 4.59 
Board Size 6.69 1.69 3.00 14.00 6.25 1.69 3.00 14.00 
Meeting times 8.20 2.98 3.00 25.00 10.65 3.94 4.00 36.00 
Independent Director  0.50 0.12 0.00 1.33 0.60 0.18 0.00 1.67 
Management holding 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.42 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.78 
Duality 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
National Owner 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
National owner 
*Duality 
0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
QFII† 1.34 2.10 0.00 8.87 9.02 10.18 0.00 45.59 
SSF 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.35 0.00 6.26 
SF 0.12 0.36 0.00 3.39 0.13 0.36 0.00 5.49 
SIF 0.30 0.48 0.00 3.28 2.44 3.76 0.00 25.79 
Top5 2.26 2.37 0.05 9.41 16.94 10.93 0.27 51.64 
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Full sample (AS>0 or AS=0, Observation No. =8,562) 
 2003 2008 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Log Acquisition 
Scale†† 
17.37 2.23 0.00 22.58 18.09 2.23 0.00 24.48 
Log Sales 20.40 1.55 -8.52 26.76 13.22 13.05 -8.52 26.02 
Log Cash 19.17 1.22 14.19 23.58 19.54 1.43 11.36 24.82 
Log Intangible Asset 14.33 8.12 -9.21 22.24 16.60 6.00 -9.21 23.89 
Leverage 0.47 0.26 0.01 4.34 0.48 0.19 0.00 0.96 
Log Cap Exp 17.93 1.81 9.35 24.59 18.34 1.98 9.21 26.13 
Cash Dividend 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.68 0.09 0.16 0.00 2.00 
Tobin’s Q 2.01 1.35 0.45 4.59 2.15 1.31 -9.12 8.05 
Board Size 6.71 1.73 3.00 15.00 6.22 1.68 2.00 15.00 
Meeting times 7.54 3.15 2.00 32.00 9.68 3.49 3.00 36.00 
Independent Director  0.50 0.13 0.00 1.33 0.60 0.18 0.00 1.67 
Management holding 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.75 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.78 
Duality 0.90 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 
National Owner 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
National owner 
*Duality 
0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
QFII 0.57 1.51 0.00 8.87 5.82 9.40 0.00 45.59 
SSF 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.85 0.07 0.33 0.00 6.26 
SF 0.07 0.25 0.00 3.39 0.11 0.50 0.00 14.05 
SIF 0.16 0.38 0.00 3.28 2.00 3.52 0.00 25.79 
Top5 1.79 2.17 0.05 9.41 17.00 12.26 0.27 60.10 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008.  
†Institutional shareholders (QFII, SSF, SF and SIF) and top 5 TS shareholders (Top5) are 
weighted proportions of total shares (including NTS and TS) using total assets of PLCs as 
weights.  
†† Log form acquisition scale is regarded as missing value when acquistion did not 
happen (AS=0). 
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Table 3: Regression analysis of annual acquisition scale, using equation (5) 
 Predicted sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log sale 
  
+ 0 0.001 0 0 0.001 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Log cash 
holding 
  
+ 0.201*** 0.179*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.163*** 
 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 
Log intangible 
asset  
+ -0.01 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011* 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Leverage 
  
+ 0.693*** 0.437* 0.427* 0.427* 0.451* 
 0.255 0.254 0.254 0.254 0.255 
Log capital 
expenditure  
+ 0.256*** 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.222*** 
 0.03 0.029 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Cash dividend 
  
+ 0.333 0.429 0.431 0.431 0.357 
 0.312 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.314 
Tobin’s Q 
  
+ 0.106** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
Board size 
  
+  0.065** 0.067** 0.067** 0.064** 
  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Meeting times 
  
+  0.059*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 
  0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Independent  
Director %  
+ or -  0.620* 0.649* 0.651* 0.596 
  0.364 0.364 0.365 0.365 
Management 
holding  
-  -2.239*** -2.162*** -2.158*** -2.131*** 
  0.474 0.493 0.494 0.494 
Duality 
  
+ or -   -0.333** -0.378 -0.371 
   0.139 0.234 0.234 
National owned 
  
+   0.058 -0.004 0.004 
   0.096 0.279 0.279 
National*duality 
  
+ or -    0.069 0.047 
    0.291 0.291 
QFII  0     0.015 
      0.012 
SSF  0     -0.112 
      0.1 
SF  0     0 
      0.025 
SIF  0     0.016 
      0.013 
Top5  0     0.007 
      0.009 
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.154 0.175 0.177 0.177 0.178 
N  1,998 1,998 1,997 1,997 1,997 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression analysis on acquisition scale, Heckman selection model  
  Selection 
Biases 
Heckman 
(2SLS) 
Heckman 
 (ML) 
Heckman 
 (ML, cluster) 
4a. Acquisition regression: dependent variable Log Acquisition Scale                
Log sale  → 0 -0.004 -0.004 
  0.005 0.005 0.004 
Log cash holding  ↑ 0.167*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
  0.035 0.038 0.038 
Log intangible asset  ↑ -0.012* -0.014** -0.014**  
  0.007 0.007 0.006 
Leverage  ↓ 0.438* 0.481* 0.481**  
  0.253 0.257 0.235 
Log capital 
expenditure  
↑ 0.221*** 0.124*** 0.124**  
 0.031 0.032 0.056 
Cash dividend  ↑ 0.399 0.283 0.283*** 
  0.308 0.334 0.074 
Tobin’s Q  ↓ 0.126*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 
  0.045 0.048 0.068 
Board size  ↓ 0.070** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
  0.03 0.032 0.03 
Meeting times  ↑ 0.051*** -0.008 -0.008 
  0.013 0.014 0.016 
Independent 
Director % 
↓ 0.681* 0.874** 0.874**  
 0.363 0.394 0.397 
Management holding  ↑ -2.217*** -2.525*** -2.525*** 
 0.492 0.533 0.589 
Duality → -0.371 -0.335 -0.335*   
  0.233 0.256 0.198 
National owned  → 0.032 0.287 0.287 
  0.278 0.303 0.28 
National*duality  → 0.06 0.018 0.018 
  0.289 0.315 0.213 
4b. Selection regression: dependent variable acquisition dummy†                
QFII   -0.020*** -0.013** -0.013 
  0.007 0.006 0.01 
SSF   0.153** 0.140** 0.140*** 
  0.063 0.058 0.027 
SF   -0.019 -0.011 -0.011 
  0.012 0.013 0.03 
SIF   0.074*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  0.008 0.007 0.01 
Top5  0.057*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
   0.004 0.004 0.008 
Mills                      
Selectivity effect  
(lambda=rho*sigma)  
 -0.254* -1.853*** -1.853*** 
 0.143 0.109 0.344 
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LR test of 
indep. eqns. (rho=0) 
 - chi2(1) =60.37  
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
chi2(1) =32.71 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
N  6,639 6,639 6,639 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
† Results of corporate finance and governance characteristics in the selection regression 
are not reported in this table to save space. Interested readers can contact with authors.    
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